



This  note  is intended  to  flesh  out  selected  issues  suggested  in  the
MacDonald and Rude/Fulton papers from the perspective of the role of compe-
tition law and policy  in agribusiness.
Conceptual  Issues
Competition  laws and policy (CLP) are among those issues consistent
with Free Trade,  a "mixture  of public  goods and a result of market failure",  as
stated by Knutson et al in the last paper in this publication. Thus, as a justifica-
tion  of antitrust policy,  the power of the State intervenes  in markets  through
regulatory  enforcement  to correct  imperfections  in the functioning  of supply
and demand.
The basic assumption of CLP is that a market with more competitors is
a market that delivers  lower prices, which is to admit that a monopolist extracts
extra-competitive  rents,  thus  reducing  overall  welfare.  As  commented  by
MacDonald,  collusion  - the  meanest  form  of monopolistic  conduct  and
undisputedly  almost always an antitrust offense - attests to that. One  example
is the lysine world-wide price fixing scheme unveiled in 1998 which generated
40 to 70  percent price  increases.  Given the above principle,  a more  concen-
trated  market  creates  incentives  for collusive  behavior  and  abuse  of market
power. But, are concentrated  markets noxious  by definition?
MacDonald  identifies  two basic  areas  of concern  in agribusiness:  1)
concentrated  markets;  and 2) contract agribusiness.  In my view, neither paper
provides  solid evidence to conclude that agribusinesses  operate in markets that
are too concentrated,  nor produced conclusive evidence to raise deep concerns
on  the contracting  trend being  followed by agribusiness.  A  particular  market
should not be regarded  as too concentrated  simply by means of a simple C4 or
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(which  both  papers  recognize  as being  very  low  in agribusiness).  Also,  effi-
ciencies  should be  weighed  against the alleged anti-competitive  effects stem-
ming from "excessive" concentration. Efficiencies (including innovation, econo-
mies of scale, intellectual property enhancement,  among others) may be absent
if markets  become unconcentrated.  As  to the concerns  raised  by contractual
arrangements,  the  MacDonald  paper fails  to balance  anti-competitive  effects
against so many obvious benefits. Contracts  tend to distribute risks among par-
ties, reduce transaction  costs,  offer stability and may prevent  free ride,  so per-
haps  contractual  arrangements  may be doing more good than evil in many in-
stances. At least in the  case of Mexico, my hunch is that contract  agribusiness
is  a  feature  of the more  developed  areas,  while  contractual  investments  are
close  to zero in the poorest farms.
The  Mexican  Perspective
Over the last fifteen  years,  Mexico has implemented  a three-pronged
strategy towards structural  reform:  trade liberalization,  deregulation of crucial
economic activities,  and privatization of many industries previously under gov-
ernment control.  Competition policy was seen in  1993  as a necessary comple-
ment to structural reform, therefore  a pro-efficiency antitrust statute was adopted
and its  enforcement  was entrusted to  a truly independent  agency,  the Federal
Competition  Commission.
Discussion  of competition  law  enforcement  in the agriculture/cattle/
farming area must be divided into:  1) the primary sector, mainly including peas-
ants  and basic production  processes  up to marketing,  where lots  of collusive
arrangements in formal breach of the statute take place but that enjoy an under-
standable  de  facto  structural  exemption;  and  2)  the  processed  goods  sector,
where cases have been reviewed by the Federal Competition Commission. Most
relevant cases in this area include:
* market obstructions by  local governments;
In  1996  there was  a case where  the Government of the State of Sinaloa'  was
found  unduly  impeding  entry  of flowers  from  other states  alleging  lack of a
local  permit  to  enter.  The  FCC  instructed  the State  to cease  and desist  such
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practice.  The FCC has pursued a good number of cases of similar nature  after-
wards.
* price fixing;
In  a  1997  case,  the  FCC  investigated  an  alleged  price  fixing  scheme  in  the
marketing  of poultry  in Yucatan.  The  defendants  were  acquitted.  Since  then,
the  FCC has  pursued  tortilla distributors  (1999)2 http://cfc.gob.mx  November
1999. and milk cooperatives (2000) for similar collusive behavior,  with no con-
demning rules thus far.
* merger  control.
The FCC cleared  the merger of several mill facilities related to a vertical inte-
gration plan  of the Bimbo Group (bread) in  19983;  and also the integration of
similar production facilities of the Gamesa-Pepsico Group  (cookies and crack-
ers)4 . The FCC also  authorized  Bachoco5 to purchase  Campi,  a horizontal
merger of prominent and efficient poultry Mexican firms. Finally, two technol-
ogy related international transactions were reviewed by the FCC: the Monsanto/
Asgrow/Cargill/Sehisa6 merger,  cleared with conditions,  which  involved  cer-
tain ingredients  of an  international  relevant  market  and  also considered  the
importance  of research  and IP  efficiency.  The  FCC  also  cleared  the BASF/
American  Cyanamid 7 merger, citing research and development  efficiencies.
Cross-  Border  Issues And  Potential Developments
As far as NAFTA is concerned,  its Chapter XV contains too few provi-
sions  on  competition  law  and policy,  and  they are  vague ...... only  stating that
Parties  shall "adopt or maintain  measures  to proscribe  anti-competitive  busi-
ness conduct and take appropriate  action with respect thereto",  a will to coop-
2 See: Federal Competition Commission Investigation of Monopolistic  Practices Reso-
lution  at  http://cfc.gob.  mx/cfc99i/resolutions/investigaciones/november99/
TORTILLAS. htm
3 See: Economic  Competition Gazette  March-August  1998,  p.  111.
4 See: Economic  Competition Gazette  March August  1998,  p. 140.
5 See:  Federal  Competition  Commission  Merger  Resolution  at  http://cfc.gob.mx
Dec. 1999.
6  See: Economic Competition Report  1999.  Federal Competition Commission, p. 28.
7  See: Federal  Competition Commission  Merger Resolution  at http://cfc.gob.tmx June
2000.
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erate,  some obligations  as to check on state enterprises  conduct  and the estab-
lishment of a Working Group to report and make recommendations on the rela-
tionship  between  trade  and competition  policy.  Controversies  on competition
matters may not be solved through the NAFTA panel mechanism.
On the bilateral  front,  Mexico and the  United States have entered into
an antitrust  enforcement  agreement,  in force  since July  2000. This agreement
involves the  FCC with  the  U.S.  Department  of Justice  and the  Federal Trade
Commission,  and contains the following  basic features:
* a  notification  mechanism  by  which  enforcement  actions  taken  by
one country that may affect  important interests  of the other shall be
notified;
* calls for coordination  of enforcement  actions  between agencies;
* provides  positive community  obligations  (country  A  may  request
country B to investigate anti-competitive  behavior in the latter's ter-
ritory when  such conduct affects  interests of country A);
* agencies  may share non-confidential  information;
* agencies shall grant each other assistance to obtain evidence or testi-
mony.
The United  States  and Canada have a similar arrangement  in place.
What can we expect on this front? As investments from the United States,
Canada  and  Mexico  increase,  one  could  expect  cross-border  problems  to  arise.
Problems  could arise in the area of state aid/subsidies,  or in the area of protective
regulation,  and  in  antidumping  procedures,  due  to  the cartel-like  arrangements
organized  to litigate these matters. Attention should be directed to minimize poten-
tial risks:  why not eradicate  antidumping  in the NAFTA area  (and replace it with
predatory pricing regulation),  especially in view of the success stories of Australia/
New Zealand or, more recently, the FTA between Canada and Chile?
More  has  to be done  to eradicate  regulation that over-protects  groups
that  abuse  their  power to  engage  in  anticompetitive  conduct.  For  example,
CONPAPA,  the  Mexican trade organization,  allegedly  was used by  Frito-Lay
as a vehicle  to fuel a "buy-Mexican" campaign designed to obstruct competitor
"Pringles"  from  entering  the market,  under the  claim  that "Pringles"  was not
from Mexican potatoes.  Another issue to look at: is the antitrust exemption for
export cartels  still justified?